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MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
POLITICAL LAW: A TAXONOMY OF 
POWER 
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT & LINA KHAN 
INTRODUCTION 
Market structure is deeply political. One reason is that all markets 
are governed by law.1 The structure of a market at any given time is 
the product of political decisions—made and not made—about how 
players in that market will be allowed to use their power. Another 
reason market structure is political is that power in the market affects 
us as citizens. Ever-increasing corporate size and concentration 
undercut democratic self-governance by disproportionately 
influencing governmental actors, as recognized by campaign finance 
reformers. Often overlooked, corporate structure is also political 
because it inscribes what we can and cannot do, and hence imposes on 
citizens a form of private governance unaccountable to the public. In 
competitive markets, the freedom to choose among buyers and sellers 
limits the power of any one actor. Conversely, in highly concentrated 
markets a few dominant companies can assume enough power to 
restrain, and even control, the actions of others. 
Because market structure is political, legal rules—like those found 
in antitrust or the public purpose doctrine adopted by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)—can shape economic power 
and potentially divest it when it threatens to undermine the political 
system. This premise, shared by Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, 
and Louis Brandeis, is based on the understanding that decentralized 
economic power and democratic self-government are deeply 
intertwined.2 Oligarchy or monopolization in one realm (political or 
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economic) leads to monopolization and oligarchy in the other. 
Unfortunately, this belief has fallen into desuetude in law as legal 
scholarship has built up a division between the study of economic and 
political power. The separation constitutes an unnecessary—and 
arguably ideological—division that has undermined the capacity of 
laws to explicitly regulate the economy and the political system 
respectively. Therefore, the regulation of one must be understood in 
terms of its impacts on the other. 
The goal of this Article is to create a way of seeing how market 
structure is innately political. It provides a taxonomy of ways in which 
large companies frequently exercise powers that possess the character 
of governance. Broadly, these exercises of power map onto three 
bodies of activity we generally assign to government: to set policy, to 
regulate markets, and to tax. We add a fourth category—which we call 
“dominance,” after Brandeis—as a kind of catchall describing the 
other political impacts.3 The activities we outline will not always fit 
neatly into these categories, nor do all companies engage in all of 
these levels of power—that is not the point. The point is that Bank of 
America and Exxon govern our lives in a way that, say, the local ice 
cream store in your hometown does not. Explicitly understanding the 
power these companies wield as a form of political power expands the 
range of legal tools we should consider when setting policy around 
them. 
The taxonomy intends to categorize activities ranging from the 
most obvious exercises of political power to the least obvious. Some 
exercises of political power are fairly overt—such as spending money 
to elect or defeat a candidate. Some are largely interpreted as non-
political, but have political import, such as money spent by a company 
attempting to oust a rival. There are various kinds of power in 
between, including the power wielded by creating and disseminating 
public information. 
Any final definition of “power” is elusive. Thomas Hobbes defined 
power as a man’s “present means, to obtain some future apparent 
good.”4 It is also frequently described as “that state of affairs which 
holds in a given relationship, A-B, such that a given influence attempt 
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 3.  We recognize the fundamental indeterminacy of these terms. We use them as 
scaffolding and to encourage a way of seeing.  
 4.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 54 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651). 
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by A over B makes A’s desired change in B more likely.”5 Power may 
be exercised through force, coercion, tradition, wealth, social status, 
resource control, information, or persuasion. Likewise, “politics” is not 
susceptible to easy definition. For our purposes, we are interested in 
the ways in which companies either act as political institutions (by 
claiming authority to govern, either within their industry or within 
society as a whole), or as political organizations, by greatly impacting 
those political institutions, either through design or structure. Our 
taxonomy is not absolutely inclusive, but covers the primary ways in 
which companies in modern American society wield power. 
Our purpose is to create an integrated vantage point through 
which to see the political effects of how markets are structured. We 
hope to expand the academic scope of those studying elections, and 
support a larger understanding of how concentrated corporate power 
perverts the democratic polity through means other than campaign 
donations and lobbying. The implication is that those concerned with 
preserving authentic democratic self-governance should focus their 
efforts on restoring antitrust policy, and that campaign finance reform 
should be seen as deeply connected to antitrust policy. Because of the 
dynamic interaction between these forms of political economic power, 
concentrated market structure enacts a form of private governance 
that threatens democratic self-government. 
This Article joins a new frontier in the debate about the scope of 
antitrust, adding to a growing body of scholarship.6 We begin in Part I 
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AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
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and consumer welfare” model of antitrust is “bad history, bad policy, and bad law.” Robert 
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–53 (1979). We also 
expand on academics like corporate law and governance professor James Kwak, who 
interrogates forms of political influence, like cultural and cognitive capture, that operate outside 
of material self-interest. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 
TEACHOUT 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:35 PM 
40 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
by developing our taxonomy of political power, documenting how the 
absence of competition enables companies to exert power over 
individuals in explicit and implicit ways, implicating us as citizens. In 
Part II, we document how the law traditionally viewed company size 
and concentration through a political lens, and why that changed. In 
Part III, we suggest that America should return to a political vision of 
corporate structure, and examine the implications this has for 
recovering antitrust policy. 
Throughout, we discuss size and concentration, which we take to 
be connected. Our concern with size is with regard to size relative to 
the total economy. A company’s political power is at its apex when it 
is both large in terms of the economy and plays a dominant role in its 
own markets. 
Because companies wielding these forms of power enact a form of 
governance over us, in Part IV we argue that corporate market 
structure rules should be understood as political rules. The mutual 
segregation of corporate law and political theory has undermined 
each field’s capacity to explain, understand, and propose solutions. 
Therefore, scholars and lawmakers ought to treat a certain category of 
corporations (as defined by structure and size) as political 
organizations, and treat the rules governing those corporations as 
“political rules.” 
Our goal is not to sketch out specific solutions but to create a way 
of thinking about the problem and gesture to a traditional means of 
addressing it. A political economy dominated by large companies, 
along with economies of scale in the purchase of political power, is a 
problem for representative democracy. For democratic purposes, an 
economy populated by many small businesses is preferable to an 
economy dominated by large and concentrated industries. Excessive 
corporate size tends to hurt democratic self-government because it 
enables a handful of actors to purchase disproportionate political 
power and to subject citizens to systems of private governance that 
become less accountable the bigger and fewer the corporations. 
We will use the words “antitrust” and “monopoly” throughout the 
Article. In doing so, we do not refer to the particular meanings as 
interpreted in existing law. Instead, we refer to a general spirit. 
Antitrust means, for us, government power to limit company size and 
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concentration; this incarnation is an ethos, not a legal term. Monopoly 
for our purposes refers to “situations in which sufficient control would 
be exercised over price by an individual producer or by a colluding 
group of producers to make possible monopoly profits, i.e., profits 
above the rate necessary to induce new investment in other industries 
not subject to monopoly control.”7 This definition animates our usage, 
but does not exhaust it: Monopoly-like or even oligopolistic situations 
can enable the exercises of political power we describe below, and 
hence also warrant the concerns we raise in this Article. 
I.  FORMS OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
It is beyond the scope of one article to explore all the political-
economic repercussions of an economy dominated by large 
companies. Instead, we will focus on three broad forms of political 
power: (1) the power to set policy, (2) the power to regulate, and (3) 
the power to tax. We discuss each in turn with an eye to how these 
exercises of power exhibit characteristics of governance. We are not 
saying these activities are always conducted with explicit political 
intent or that they are all innately political—just that when large 
companies in uncompetitive markets undertake them, the power they 
levy is government-like. Because these activities can set policy, 
regulate, and tax, they affect our lives not just as consumers but also 
as citizens. 
In business law, these forms of power might be called a subset of 
“nonmarket” strategies. As David Bach and David Bruce Allen wrote 
recently: 
Nonmarket strategy recognizes that businesses are social and 
political beings, not just economic agents. Because companies 
create and distribute value, a plethora of actors seek to influence 
them—formally, through laws and regulation, and informally, 
through social pressure, activism and efforts to shape the public 
perception of business. Companies can’t escape this. Smart 
executives, therefore, engage with their social and political 
environment, helping shape the rules of the game and reducing the 
risk of being hemmed in by external actors. Yet, few companies are 
prepared to do the hard work and commit long term to developing 
an effective nonmarket strategy. Fewer still understand how to 
integrate market and nonmarket strategies to sustain competitive 
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CHARACTERISTICS 139 (Gardiner C. Means ed., 1939). 
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advantage.8 
Nonmarket strategy includes public relations, lobbying, legal 
change, and market structure. Put another way, “Nonmarket issues 
can play out in multiple settings, from courtrooms and regulatory 
proceedings to parliamentary committee hearings and industry 
forums all the way to the news media, the public domain or the 
blogosphere.”9 
Though we do not discuss every nonmarket strategy here (most 
importantly, we do not engage with the complicated political role of 
direct-to-consumer advertising), the word “nonmarket” is helpful 
because it signals that regulation—in the form of antitrust laws or 
other rules—would not interfere with “the market,” even according to 
the terms of the market participants. However, our investigation is 
more expansive than the strategy described above. First, we are 
examining the political role of companies, not simply the political 
choices facing an individual company. Second, we are less interested 
in the actual strategic choices made, and more interested in the 
exercise of power. When it comes to democracy, the accidental feudal 
lords are every bit as important as those who set out to gain political 
power. Therefore, our portrait assumes the unity of the “company,” 
instead of treating shareholders and insiders differently. 
When describing the power exercised by these companies, we use 
terms like “dominant,” “monopolistic,” and “oligopolistic.” Our use of 
these terms is consciously imprecise. Because we are interested in 
categorizing the forms of power born of size and concentration, 
debates about the technical contours of these terms are secondary, 
and potentially irrelevant, to our work. 
A. Power to Set Policy 
The five categories of power we describe below are political 
because they drive legislation, sway rule making, and shape regulatory 
agendas. These vectors of power point to Washington, D.C. These 
activities range from highly conscious, overtly political, and semi-
visible (i.e., campaign donations and lobbying), to subtle and largely 
invisible (i.e., directing the politics of employees). The source of the 
power is not always size, but size coupled with concentration 
 
 8.  David Bach & David Bruce Allen, What Every CEO Needs to Know About Non-
Market Strategy, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Apr. 1, 2010), 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/what-every-ceo-needs-to-know-about-nonmarket-strategy/. 
 9.  Id. 
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intensifies the force and reach of these categories of power. 
1. Power through Campaign Funding 
The first way companies exercise political power is the most 
obvious. We call this “overt investments for direct political influence.” 
They include all the overt uses of financial resources to shape public 
policy and influence the traditional political process in ways favorable 
to the company. 
Companies spend a lot of money in politics. Companies may lobby 
elected officials directly, lobby regulators, or play a large role in trade 
associations that lobby. Companies can either create PACs that spend 
money on campaigns, making access to decision-makers easier, or use 
SuperPACs or LLCs to spend independently. During the financial 
reform bill fight of 2010, the financial industry officially employed 
2565 lobbyists, used media campaigns to explain how the crisis 
happened, and donated generously to candidates.10 
Charities aspire to exert influence this way too. Though some 
socially responsible spending is done for non-political reasons, some is 
done to enable political power. One recent instance of such strategic 
involvement in charities comes from Comcast’s pending merger with 
Time Warner Cable. Executive Vice President David Cohen oversees 
government affairs at Comcast, but also runs its charitable 
foundation, which gave $320,000 to the Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce over a five-year period.11 When the Comcast merger was 
announced, the New York Times reported on the connection, noting 
that one of the first supporters of the merger was the Hispanic 
Chamber.12 Another example of this kind of political involvement is 
Toyota’s successful lobbying to get California to give low-emissions 
vehicles preferred high-occupancy vehicle lane access: “With 
minimum financial investment, Toyota managed to give its product a 
decisive competitive advantage.”13 
 
 
 10.  Suzanna Andrews, The Woman Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/11/elizabeth-warren-201111. 
 11.  Eric Lipton, Comcast’s Web of Lobbying and Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/business/media/comcasts-web-of-lobbying-and-
philanthropy.html?_r=0.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  See Bach & Allen, supra note 8.  
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2. Power through Staffing and Recruiting from Government 
The second way in which corporations exercise political power is 
by staffing employees of and recruiting employees from government. 
This famed “revolving door” enables companies to shape political 
outcomes explicitly by writing policy and taming enforcement, and 
implicitly by inculcating worldviews and inscribing the parameters of 
possible outcomes. The former agribusiness lobbyist who joins the 
Food and Drug Administration may loosen labeling requirements if 
he intends to return to industry, while the Department of Justice 
enforcer who aspires eventually to join J.P. Morgan may hesitate to 
antagonize a potential employer. 
Congressional aides frequently rotate through the revolving door. 
Since 2007, more than 1650 staffers have registered to lobby within a 
year of leaving Capitol Hill.14 The economics line up: Roughly two-
thirds of revolving door lobbyists generate more revenue trying to 
influence legislation than lawmakers earn for writing legislation.15 
And companies pay a premium for public sector experience—
lobbyists who have served in government generate three times as 
much in revenue than those who have not.16 
A paragon of revolving door dynamics is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The last six SEC enforcement chiefs 
have taken jobs at top private firms and banks including JPMorgan 
Chase and Bank of America.17 According to the Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO), from 2001 through 2010 more than 
400 SEC alumni filed close to 2000 disclosure forms stating they 
planned to represent a client before the agency.18 As the POGO 
 
 14.  Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Law Doesn’t End Revolving Door on Capitol Hill, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 1, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/law-
doesnt-end-revolving-door-on-capitol-hill/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.  
 15.  Lee Drutman & Alexander Furnas, K Street Pays Top Dollar for Revolving Door 
Talent, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/01/21/revolving-door-lobbyists-government-
experience/. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Ben Protess, Slowing the Revolving Door Between Public and Private Jobs, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Nov. 11, 2013, 1:35PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/slowing-the-
revolving-door-between-public-and-private-jobs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 18.  PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC 
CREATES RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 8 (2013), available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/602191/20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolving-
door.pdf. As POGO notes, “Those disclosures are just the tip of the iceberg, because former 
SEC employees are required to file them only during the first two years after they leave the 
agency.” Id. at 2. 
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report explains, former SEC employees have, among other favorable 
outcomes, helped companies win exemptions and obtain regulatory 
relief in the form of “no action letters.”19 The New York Times found 
close to 350 instances over the last decade where the SEC gave major 
Wall Street banks and other financial institutions a pass on fraud and 
related sanctions.20 
It is difficult to prove that ties to corporations or aspirations to 
work for them ever shape any particular vote or decision on 
enforcement or policy, as officials can always offer explanations for 
why they believe a certain choice advanced the public interest.21 And 
at least one study has rebutted the idea that revolving door dynamics 
weaken SEC regulation.22 Some people even argue that the desire to 
join private practice actually incentivizes tough enforcement, which 
can raise one’s profile and showcase one’s expertise.23 
Rank material self-interest is not the only driver of regulatory 
capture, however. Even if enforcers do not explicitly or consciously 
trace industry demands, social ties between regulators and the 
regulated can tilt policy. James Kwak and others expand traditional 
capture theory to include non-rational forms of influence—like 
identity, status, and relationships—that gently yet insistently tug policy 
in a direction favorable to the regulated. Kwak terms this 
phenomenon “cultural capture.” Highly pedigreed financiers and 
financial regulators will share alumni networks and block parties, and 
the nature of those bonds matters. Asking how economic policies that 
contributed to the 2007 financial crash had won such widespread 
credence, Kwak writes: 
Although several signs of traditional capture were present—
notably a well-oiled revolving door between regulatory agencies 
and industry—the argument for capture in the strict sense is 
 
 19.  See id. at 10–14. 
 20.  Edward Wyatt, SEC is Avoiding Tough Sanctions for Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/business/sec-is-avoiding-tough-sanctions-for-large-
banks.html.  
 21.  Nor do industry ties necessarily predict lax enforcement. For example, Gary Gensler, a 
former partner at Goldman Sachs, served as an aggressive head of the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission. 
 22.  Ed deHaan et al., Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s Enforcement?, AM. ACCT. 
ASS’N (August 2012), http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sec-revolving-door-study-july2012.pdf. 
 23.  Id. See also Jed S. Rakoff, Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/. 
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weakened by a plausible alternative explanation: that agency 
officials were genuinely persuaded by the argument that free 
financial markets were good for the public. In this light, the 
important question is why theories of the world that are wrong or 
at least widely contested gain broad acceptance in a specific 
community—here, the community of financial regulatory agencies. 
Where the underlying theories require highly specialized expertise 
(such as advanced degrees in financial economics) and are 
empirically contested, it would be naïve to expect policy debates to 
turn solely on the intellectual merits of the parties’ positions. 
Cultural capture provides an alternative explanation of how policy 
is formed—neither through simple corruption nor through purely 
rational debate, but through the soft pressures that arise from the 
specific characteristics of the regulatory community.24 
Notably, even after the financial collapse proved certain 
deregulatory theories wrong, those theories still shaped how officials 
responded. The way regulators handled the wreckage—their instincts, 
their priorities—was very telling of the assumptions they shared with 
financial executives. This is not per se a criticism of how the Treasury 
Department and Federal Reserve steered us through the aftermath—
when each day brought fears of new tremors—but an observation that 
certain policies that would have rankled financial executives were 
never on the table. A team comprised of Larry Summers and Timothy 
Geithner shared a worldview with Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein: 
a set of unspoken beliefs about the role and benefits of markets. That 
common ideology narrowed the Overton window, foreclosing a 
certain set of policy responses.25 
3. Power through Creating Information 
Another way companies exert political power is through creating 
and disseminating information, both to encourage a favorable 
(de)regulatory environment, and to steer specific rules or laws. 
Industry trade groups frequently publish reports opining on policy, or 
directly hire scholars to produce research. Many professorships and 





 24.  Kwak, supra note 6, at 71. 
 25.  The “Overton window” describes the relatively narrow range of potential ideas and 
policies that decision-makers and influencers consider politically acceptable, and hence possible.  
TEACHOUT 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:35 PM 
2014] MARKET STRUCTURE & POLITICAL LAW 47 
For example, the four biggest telecommunications carriers—
AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile—spent approximately $37 
million in 2013 lobbying the FCC on a range of policy issues. But they 
spent almost twice as much on “influence campaigns”—paying 
universities, think tanks, and public relations firms.26 By issuing an 
onslaught of research, companies can shape policy through 
“information capture.” As Wendy Wagner writes: 
In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the 
excessive use of information and related information costs as a 
means of gaining control over regulatory decision-making in 
informal rulemakings. A continuous barrage of letters, telephone 
calls, meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal comments, post-rule 
comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices of appeal 
from knowledgeable interest groups over the life cycle of a 
rulemaking can have a “machine-gun” effect on overstretched 
agency staff.27 
To take a recent instance of how this can play out, as part of the 
2008 Farm Bill, Congress instructed the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) to update the Packers and Stockyards Act, a 
1920s-era law in disrepair. In 2010 the USDA published its proposed 
rule, which would have closely policed how meat packers and 
processors wield their market power against farmers, and reined in 
abusive practices, such as the payment scheme known as the 
“tournament system.”28 These rules would have ushered in sweeping 
reforms across the industry, leveling the playing field between the 
world’s biggest meat companies and independent farmers. So the 
meat lobby got working. By late 2010, the National Chicken Council 
had commissioned a study estimating that the rule would cost the 
broiler industry more than $1 billion over five years.29 The National 
 
 26.  Allan Holmes, The Wireless Wars, SLATE (Mar. 21 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/03/at_t_verizon_t_mobile_sprint_a
nd_auctioning_airwaves_the_corporate_giants.html. As James Thurber, a professor at 
American University who has been studying lobbying for thirty years, noted: “Lobbying isn’t 
just what the federal registered lobbyists do. It’s an orchestration of a variety of techniques and 
influence. . . . This includes all the advertising, white papers, surveys, grass-roots, and top-roots 
activities going on.” Id. 
 27.  Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010). 
 28.  Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation 
and Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 35338, 35343 (proposed 
June 22, 2010). See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 29.  Thomas E. Elam, Proposed GIPSA Rules Relating to the Chicken Industry: Economic 
Impact, NAT’L CHICKEN COUNCIL (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/111610-FarmEcon-Economic-Impact-Study-of-Proposed-Rule.pdf. 
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Meat Association funded research that approximated the new rule 
would cost the United States economy close to 23,000 jobs.30 The 
American Meat Institute released yet another report pegging the cost 
at $14 billion of GDP, $1.36 billion in lost tax revenue, and 104,000 
jobs.31 Tyson, meanwhile, submitted a 335-page legal brief, which 
challenged almost every portion of the rule, as well as the agency’s 
authority to enforce it. In a notable concession to the industry, the 
USDA agreed to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the rule. And by 
the time it issued the final rule, over half of the provisions had been 
diluted or abandoned, including one that would have made it easier 
for farmers to sue meat companies for unfair or deceptive practices.32 
Research has been a key weapon for financial institutions striving 
to thwart new regulations in the wake of the 2007 crash. The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—the 828-
page financial reform law Congress passed after the crisis—delegated 
significant rulemaking for around 400 regulations to government 
agencies, inviting parties to besiege policymakers with studies to 
shape final outcomes. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association paid top professors at Stanford, Harvard, and other elite 
institutions to produce research commenting on the proposed rules.33 
These studies uniformly decried the regulations, predicting they 
would raise costs across the board and sap markets of liquidity. 
Scholars also published these views in the op-ed pages of the New 
 
 30.  Economic Impact of GIPSA’s Proposed Rules, NAT’L MEAT ASS’N (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.meatami.com/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/64288. 
 31.  Ron Hays, USDA Secretary Vilsack Says Agency Will Perform Cost Benefit Analysis of 
GIPSA Rule, OKLA. FARM RPT. (Dec. 14, 2010), 
http://oklahomafarmreport.com/wire/emails/media/01347_Oklahomas_Farm_News_Update1214
2010.html.  
 32.  Compare Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Suspension of Delivery of Birds, Additional Capital 
Investment Criteria, Breach of Contract, and Arbitration, 76 Fed. Reg. 76874, 76884 (Dec. 9, 
2011) (to be codified at 9  C.F.R. pt. 201) (“[T]he provisions in the final rule were modified . . . 
to reduce, and in some cases substantially reduce the single greatest cost, which was the cost that 
could potentially arise due to the potential for litigation or administrative action.”), with 
Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation and Energy 
Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35340 (proposed June 22, 2010) (noting that the P&S Act 
envisioned private litigation as being a potential remedy, as it sets forth procedures for such 
litigation). 
 33.  In 2011 the House of Representatives repealed a requirement that those giving expert 
testimony reveal their ties to the private sector. Lee Fang, The Scholars who Shill for Wall 
Street, THE NATION (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/176809/scholars-who-shill-
wall-street#; Emily Flitter et al., Special Report: For Some Professors, Disclosure is Academic, 
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/20/us-academics-conflicts-
idUSTRE6BJ3LF20101220. 
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York Times and Wall Street Journal, and testified in congressional 
hearings on issues like derivatives regulation or the Volcker Rule—
often without disclosing their financial conflicts-of-interest.34 
Beyond issuing reports directly and paying academics for specific 
studies, companies also embed themselves in information streams. For 
example, since 1967 DuPont has run the DuPont Young Professors 
program, which provides $75,000 in annual grants to “encourage 
highly original research of value to DuPont while helping the young 
professors begin their academic career.”35 Looking through rosters of 
faculty at American universities, you will find positions like the Merck 
Professor of Biochemical Engineering at Berkeley University, the 
Tyson Chair in Food Policy Economics at the University of Arkansas, 
and the Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor at the University of 
Chicago. In 2001, the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation donated 
$3 million to George Mason University to expand a program in 
“experimental economics.”36 The growing reach of corporate influence 
on scholarship has been chronicled both by Jennifer Washburn in 
University, Inc. and the 2010 film “Inside Job.”37 
The point here is not that all privately funded study is an overt 
attempt by corporations to influence policy or the political process—a 
billionaire might fund, say, cancer research because he lost a loved 
one to the disease, or space exploration because of a childhood 
dream.38 But information and how it is interpreted are integral to how 
government makes decisions on an issue (not to mention how public 
opinion understands it or a journalist reports on it), and at any given 
moment on any given topic the total set of available information is 
shaped, in increasing part, by corporations looking to advance 
favorable policy.39 In this way, companies play the role of political 
actor. 
 
 34.  Reuters reviewed nintey-six testimonies given by eighty-two academics to the Senate 
Banking Committee and House Financial Services Committee between late 2008 and 2010 and 
found no clear standard for disclosure and that a third of those testifying did not reveal their 
financial affiliations. Emily Fliter et al., supra note 33. 
 35.  Press Release, DuPont on DuPont Young Professors (June 16, 2011), available at 
http://www2.dupont.com/Media_Center/en_US/daily_news/june/article20110616a.html. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See generally JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE 
CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2006); INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010). 
 38.  Williams J. Broad, Billionaires with Big Ideas are Privatizing American Science, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/science/billionaires-with-big-ideas-
are-privatizing-american-science.html?_r=0. 
 39.  Id. 
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4. Power to Direct the Politics of Employees and Contractors 
Dominance and lack of competition also empower companies to 
direct the political choices made by employees and suppliers. This 
exercise of power is more common in monopsony situations than 
monopoly. 
Take chicken farming. Four poultry processors control around 53 
percent of the market in the United States.40 Regionally, concentration 
is even higher.41 Practically this means that chicken farmers are often 
beholden to a single company, with scant bargaining power to 
negotiate the terms of their contracts. The industry is vertically 
integrated, which means processors hatch the chicks, mix the feed, 
slaughter the birds, and package the meat for market.42 They leave 
farmers to actually raise the birds, the riskiest and most capital-
intensive part of the business. Farmers usually take on hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in loans to build poultry houses and purchase 
heaters to warm the birds and ventilation systems to cool them, all to 
the company’s specifications.43 Meanwhile, farmer pay is 
unpredictable and occasionally arbitrary because chicken processors 
like Tyson pay farmers through the “tournament system,” which pits 
farmers against one another by pegging their pay to their ranking, 
with no accountability or transparency.44 Farmers know that if they 
protest or challenge the company, it can cut them off—and sink their 
livelihood. 
In 2009, the Obama administration announced it would convene a 
series of workshops to assess the state of consolidation in agricultural 
markets. Attorney General Eric Holder and Agriculture Secretary 
Tom Vilsack toured the country to hear directly from farmers about 
the conditions they faced.45 For many farmers, the opportunity was a 
lifeline. But in the days before the poultry hearing in Alabama, 
representatives from Tyson and Pilgrim’s Pride visited farmers to 
warn them that if they spoke out at the hearing they would face 
 
 40.  The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Nov. 2, 2012), 
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/reports/the-economic-cost-of-food-monopolies/. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET 23 (2014); Lina Khan, Obama’s Game 
of Chicken, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november_december_2012/features/obamas_gam
e_of_chicken041108.php?page=all. 
 43.  Khan, supra note 42. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
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retaliation.46 As farmers at the hearing recounted, scores of others had 
not shown up or were afraid to speak up because of the companies’ 
threats.47 For many farmers, their economic dependence lost them 
their right to free speech and assembly. 
In other instances, companies like Tyson do not need to exert their 
power; its sheer existence quells dissent. For example, Christopher 
Leonard narrates the account of Tyson employee Perry Edwards in 
The Meat Racket: 
[Perry] Edwards did not see any evidence that Tyson Foods 
delivered sick birds to [long-time farmers] Jerry and Kanita 
Yandell to retaliate against them for any perceived bad behavior. 
But what he observed was that the company had the ability to do 
so if it wanted to. Farmers around Waldron did not have the front-
seat view of this power that Edwards was afforded. But they knew 
it existed. They felt it. They perpetually feared it. And for that 
reason, they often stifled their complaints and took what Tyson 
gave them.48 
Political power is also expressed through direct communication to 
employees about the political preferences of CEOs (an expression 
enabled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission49). 
Although the letters may not, according to law, intimidate the 
employees, they can strongly communicate a preference and list 
reasons justifying it. During the 2012 election, presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney asked business owners to use their power in this way: “I 
hope you make it very clear to your employees what you believe is in 
the best interest of . . . their job . . . in the upcoming elections.”50 Real 
estate developer David Siegel sent a long letter to his employees, 
telling them that if Obama won, he would probably end up on a beach 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE 
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY 
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 10 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf. 
 48.  LEONARD, supra note 42, at 38. Political suppression is also common in battles over 
unionization. For example, in 2012 a federal judge found that Target managers had threatened 
to discipline employees who talked about the union and threatened to shut the store if workers 
voted in favor of unionization. Steven Greenhouse, Union Gets New Election at Target, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/business/new-union-vote-ordered-at-
target-store-in-valley-stream-ny.html. 
 49.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 50.  Nate C. Hindman & Christina Wilkie, Wynn Employee Voter Guide Pressures Workers 
to Vote Right, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 26, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/wynn-employee-voter-guide_n_2018595.html. 
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“without employees.”51 And Steve Wynn sent a voter guide to his 
employees.52 It is not clear that these crude tactics work: One Wynn 
Resorts employee said, “Now that I’m being told who to vote for by 
my overlord, maybe I’ll just vote for Obama.”53 However, if 
employees feel pressure or are otherwise influenced, these 
communications act as a form of employer-employee political power. 
5. Too Big to Fail 
Even in the absence of resources devoted to purchasing political 
influence, a company with a large relative size to the economy will 
have power. Bank of America’s assets are over 1 percent of the 
United States GDP.54 Exxon Mobil made $45 billion dollars in profits 
in 2008.55 When the relative size of a company is significant—certainly 
anything approaching 1 percent of GDP—democratic choices become 
constrained by the self-interest of the individual corporation. The 
relative size makes it incumbent upon legislators to design laws that 
will at a minimum ensure the stability of the company. Dominant 
firms breed uncertainty and instability in key resources—and that 
uncertainty leads to political power.56 If Lockheed Martin goes under 
and lays off all its employees, it will have an impact on the entire 
economy. Therefore, the largest companies, even without lobbying, 





 51.  Scott Keyes, Billionaire CEO Threatens to Fire Employees if Obama Wins, 
THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 9, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/10/09/978211/david-
siegel-fire-employees/. 
 52.  Hindman & Wilkie, supra note 50. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  As of December 2013, Bank of America’s total assets amounted to $2.1 billion, while 
the United States GDP hovered around $16 trillion. See Holding Companies with Assets Greater 
than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR., http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/top50form.aspx 
(last updated Dec. 31, 2013); US Real GDP by Year, MULTPL.COM, http://www.multpl.com/us-
gdp-inflation-adjusted/table (last updated Mar. 31, 2014). 
 55.  John Porretto, Exxon Mobil Reports Record $45.2 Billion Profit for 2008, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/30/exxon-mobil-
reports-recor_n_162468.html. 
 56.  As Simon Johnson and James Kwak argue in their book, blogs, and articles, this 
structure reeks of oligarchy. Gigantic firms are a real threat to self-government. If big 
corporations can demand bailouts and dictate policy it takes away the ability of the people to 
choose the policies they most want. The policy is “chosen” by the people in the same way that 
someone with a gun to their head “chooses” to do what the holder of the gun tells them to. See 
generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 6. 
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Companies that are large relative to the size of American GDP 
use this power by threatening to collapse or leave if their demands are 
not met. After the recent financial crisis, because of the size (relative 
to the economy) of the biggest banks and investment firms, politicians 
made the decision that they should not be allowed to fail and bring 
the country down with them. Putting aside the banks causal role in 
the crisis (which is itself arguably a function of relative size), imagine 
that there were 10,000 banks, instead of 5, facing restructuring. The 
government could have allowed some to fail while others were 
restructured. Though the government might still have chosen to 
provide a bailout, it could have had more bargaining power with the 
banks in determining the size of the bailout. You can think of this kind 
of size as the “too big to fail” rent, a promised subsidy that enables 
cheap capital and that cheapens the cost of seeking political power. 
B. Power to Regulate 
We describe two exercises of power: the power to govern what is 
in a market and the power to self-regulate. Both are political because 
they enable private actors to steer markets in a way akin to 
regulation. Unlike the power to set policy, the power to regulate 
bypasses Washington. It governs through the marketplace. Notably, 
this form of power is largely born through economic dominance and 
market power. 
As we describe above, large companies routinely win favorable 
regulations by influencing the political process through lobbying and 
revolving door tactics. A more direct and less visible way to set 
regulations is to be a monopolist. The standards a dominant company 
sets can determine the course of an industry much like a government 
agency does. Take, for example, how Wal-Mart steered the deodorant 
market. Through the early 1990s, almost all deodorant containers 
came packaged in a paper-box. Wal-Mart executives decided the box 
added unnecessary cost, and told suppliers to eliminate it.57 So the 
suppliers did. Today practically no deodorant comes packaged in a 
box. As Charles Fishman observes, “[w]hole forests have not fallen in 
part because of the decision made in the Wal-Mart home office at the 
intersection of Walton Boulevard and SW 8th Street in Bentonville, 
 
 57.  CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL 
COMPANY REALLY WORKS—AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1 
(2006). 
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Arkansas, to eliminate the box.”58  Seen this way, the effects of Wal-
Mart’s decision resemble a prohibition by the Environmental 
Protection Agency designed to save trees. 
What is more, the more concentrated the market, the greater the 
governing power. For example, if we have a competitive shampoo 
market, whether there are toxins in our shampoo will be determined 
by hundreds of executive teams at hundreds of firms with competing 
interests. But if one company monopolizes the shampoo market, that 
same decision will be made by a few executives sharing one common 
interest. In the latter scenario, the shampoo company enjoys power 
akin to a government, without being accountable to the public. 
Similarly, if there is only one seller of all books, that seller is capable 
of exercising arbitrary power over the content of our books—akin to 
the censorship power of government. 
A recent example of how dominant companies become de facto 
regulators centers around Zilmax, the feed hormone used to bulk up 
cattle in the final weeks of their lives. Though the additive hit 
commercial markets in 2007, research showing it harmed the quality 
of beef kept feedlot owners from buying it.59 Enter Tyson, JBS, Cargill, 
and the National Beef Packing Company. Once the four meatpackers, 
which control 85 percent of the market, began accepting Zilmax-fed 
animals, its adoption rapidly spread across the whole industry.60 By 
late 2012, even feedlots leery of its side effects realized they would 
have to start using it if they wanted to stay in business.61 But when 
reports surfaced that cattle fed with Zilmax were struggling to walk 
and were displaying strange symptoms, its abandonment was equally 
swift. On August 9, 2013, Tyson, the biggest meat company in the 
world, announced it would no longer buy Zilmax-fed livestock. On 
August 16, Zilmax-producer Merck said it was suspending sales.62 No 
government agency intervened at any point; rather, it was a handful of 
executives that governed the quality of our beef supply. 
 
 
 58.  Id. at 2. 
 59.  Christopher Leonard, Why Beef is Becoming More Like Chicken, SLATE (Feb. 14, 
2013, 4:55AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/food/2013/02/ 
zilmax_the_cattle_growth_drug_that_s_making_beef_more_like_chicken.2.html. 
 60.  The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies, supra note 40. 
 61.  Leonard, supra note 59. 
 62.  Theopolis Waters & Tom Polansek, Amid Cattle Health Concerns, Merck Halts Zilmax 
Sales, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/16/us-merck-zilmax-
idUSBRE97F0S320130816. 
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Meanwhile, policies set by Facebook regulate the online privacy of 
over 1.2 billion users worldwide.63 Four airline companies govern 
which cities in America receive affordable and regular air service and 
which are cut from the grid.64 Rules decided by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange—which has swallowed up the Chicago Board of 
Trade, the Kansas City Board of Trade, and the New York Mercantile 
Exchange—now determine how our corn, wheat, and oil are priced.65 
This observation about de facto regulatory power is different from 
a critique of deregulation. We are not arguing that companies are 
presently making decisions that ought to be made by government. We 
are saying that when you have one company or small group of 
dominant companies making decisions that effectively set standards 
for the rest of the industry, those outcomes take on the character of 
governance. The crucial difference, of course, is that corporations, 
unlike government, are not accountable to the public. 
The other form of regulatory power is more overt and often 
comes in the form of an explicit suggestion that an industry “self-
regulate.” There is a large body of literature—both praising and 
critical—of corporate self-regulation. An industry “self-regulates” 
when most of the industry participants agree on standards of 
professionalism or safety, appropriate content, or environmental rules. 
Therefore a dominant company within an industry can directly 
“regulate” that industry through a trade association or other 
important self-regulatory body. 
C. Power to Tax 
The most difficult form of private political power to document is 
the power to impose a tax on the public. Unlike the power to set 
policy or to regulate—whose exercise does not always guarantee the 
desired outcome, or whose direct impact can be difficult to assess—
the power to tax costs the public immediately, at the moment the 
 
 63.  Jemima Kiss, Facebook’s 10th Birthday: From College Dorm to 1.23 Billion Users, THE 
GUARDIAN, Feb 3. 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/04/facebook-10-
years-mark-zuckerberg. 
 64.  Phillip Beau, New American Airlines Means ‘Big 4’ Control US Skies, CNBC (Feb. 14, 
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100461115; Lina Khan & Philip Longman, Terminal Sickness, 
WASH. MONTHLY (March/April 2012), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/ 
march_april_2012/features/terminal_sickness035756.php?page=all. 
 65.  The three major exchanges—where the bulk of commodity futures are traded—are 
self-regulatory organizations. “Although all four exchanges have been merged to form CME 
Group, each exchange remains a separate self-regulatory organization.” Rulebooks, CME 
GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/rulebook/ (last visited June 10, 2014).  
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power is exercised. Admittedly, “tax” is imprecise. We use “tax” to 
connote the systemic capture of resources for private ends. One 
dictionary defines tax as “a compulsory contribution to state revenue, 
levied by the government on workers’ income and business profits or 
added to the cost of some goods, services, and transactions.”66 By 
definition it might seem that a private party cannot “tax” because the 
direction in which the money flows is innate to the meaning of tax. 
But for a significant and longstanding part of economic theory, 
monopolies were thought to impose a kind of tax. As Arnold Kling 
puts it, describing consumer costs when there is a monopoly: “Note 
that if the industry were competitive and the government imposed a 
$200 per bushel tax on wheat, the result for the consumer would be 
the same. There is the same ‘deadweight loss’ for the economy. The 
only difference between a government tax and the monopoly ‘tax’ is 
that the ‘profits’ accrue to the government.”67 
It is widely established—in both antitrust theory and the world 
around us—that size and concentration correspond with market 
power. Market power enables a company to raise what it charges 
consumers and lower what it pays suppliers. The higher margins that it 
pockets serves to transfer wealth from consumers and suppliers to its 
own account. It, in essence, imposes a tax on those subject to its 
power. 
This wealth transfer empowers the company at the expense of its 
customers and suppliers, both politically and economically. 
Oftentimes these transfers will accrue in fractions of pennies, almost 
imperceptibly. Barry C. Lynn recounts how Henry Osborne 
Havemeyer, after rolling up seventeen sugar refineries, astutely asked, 
“Who cares for a quarter cent of a pound?”: 
Havemeyer meant that he did not intend to use the power he had 
amassed over our supply of sugar to gouge us suddenly and 
violently. Rather, he intended to collect his quarter of a penny tax 
from us quietly and steadily, the same way our local governments 
collect a few pennies from us quietly and steadily every time we 
buy a Slurpee at 7-Eleven. . . . For many decades, every time an 
American sprinkled some sugarcane crystals into his or her tea, 
Havemeyer and his family became just a bit richer and hence a bit 
 
 66.  Tax Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
us/definition/english/tax  (last visited June 19, 2014). 
 67.  Arnold Kling, The Problem of Monopoly, ARNOLDKLING.COM, 
http://arnoldkling.com/econ/markets/monopoly.html (last visited June 19, 2014). 
TEACHOUT 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:35 PM 
2014] MARKET STRUCTURE & POLITICAL LAW 57 
more politically powerful than you and me.68 
These wealth transfers are all the more subtle in dull and 
quotidian industries like, for example, container board, the corrugated 
material we use to box over 95 percent of all delivered packages in 
the United States.69 As noted in a recent Goldman Sachs 
memorandum, steady consolidation since the 1990s has handed the 
top four companies control over 70 percent of the market, with the 
largest player alone holding 33 percent.70 In subsequent years the 
firms restricted supplies and raised prices.71 Margins spiked from 10 
percent in 2003 to 18 percent last year—while the containerboard 
prices we all pay jumped 90 percent.72 Or take the seed industry, in 
which Monsanto controls upwards of 80 percent of genetic traits 
embedded in corn and soybeans, and together with DuPont sells 70 
percent of all corn seed.73 Since Monsanto’s roll-up of independent 
seed companies, its net profits have grown from $267 million in 2003 
to $2.5 billion last year—a staggering tenfold increase over ten years.74 
The inflation-adjusted price farmers pay for corn seed, meanwhile, has 
shot up 166 percent since 2005.75 
When sufficient market power enables a company to extract more 
wealth from consumers and employees than the company could 
absent that market power, the additional income it collects acts like a 
tax. Furthermore, the wealth transfers in concentrated markets are 
political because they make big companies bigger and enrich their 
executives and shareholders, handing both the firm and top 
individuals more political power. 
 
 68.  BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE RISE OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 48 (2010). 
 69.  GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL INV. RES., DOES CONSOLIDATION CREATE VALUE? 10–
11 (2014).  
 70.  Id. at 10. 
 71.  Id. at 10–11. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Squeezes Out Seed Business Competition, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 13, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/13/monsanto-
squeezes-out-see_n_390354.html; Jeff Swiatek, AgReliant: Corn Seed Breeder Growing 
Competition, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 4, 2013, 
http://www.indystar.com/article/20131103/BUSINESS/310280001/. 
 74.  Emiko Terazono & Neil Munshi, Monsanto at Centre of Intensifying Debate on Food, 
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
e5eef102-9990-11e3-b3a2-00144feab7de.html.  
 75.  Jacob Bunge, Big Data Comes to the Farm, Sowing Mistrust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 
2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579369283869192124.  
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D. Dominance 
Our taxonomy illustrates how size absent competition can impose 
a form of private governance on the public. A dominant company is 
unaccountable to citizens for the power it exerts, yet that power 
determines and even constrains their actions. The first three 
categories—campaign funding, staffing and recruiting from 
government, and controlling information streams—capture how 
companies strive to influence the political process. These forms of 
power are the most discrete and discernible; projects like 
opensecrets.org devote significant resources to tracking them.76 Other 
forms of power—“too big to fail,” political punishment, regulation, 
and tax—illustrate forms of political power exercised outside the 
traditional political process. This key influence is won not just through 
size and capital but also—crucially—through market structure. These 
forms of corporate power can undercut democratic self-governance in 
ways untouched by campaign finance reform. The political process is 
not the only highway to undue political control. 
In addition to operating outside of the traditional political process, 
this type of power is notable because its application does not always 
require its active exercise. Power can arise purely out of dominance. 
As Justice Louis Brandeis stated: 
Restraint of trade may be exerted upon rivals; upon buyers or 
upon sellers; upon employers or upon employed. Restraint may be 
exerted through force or fraud or agreement. It may be exerted 
through moral or through legal obligations; through fear or 
through hope. It may exist, although it is not manifested in any 
overt act, and even though there is no intent to restrain. Words of 
advice, seemingly innocent and perhaps benevolent, may restrain, 
when uttered under circumstances that make advice equivalent to 
command. For the essence of restraint is power; and power may 
arise merely out of position. Wherever a dominant position has 
been attained, restraint necessarily arises.77 
In other words, power can be experienced without being 
exercised. Our taxonomy is not exhaustive, and never could be, 
precisely because power exerts itself in infinite discreet guises. That 
this power still threatens democratic self-government—even when it 
does not manifest as concrete schemes or donations—suggests that 
 
 76.  See generally OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org. 
 77.  Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
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reformers should look beyond policing activity. They should also 
target structural advantages that derive from concentration and size. 
There are other incidental political impacts of market structure on 
political society as a whole not captured by the seven ways we discuss. 
For democratic self-government to work, society must be populated 
by people who are educated enough to know the impacts of policies, 
and be somewhat capable of imagining other policies or other 
impacts. There is something harder to capture than information alone 
that is critical for successful self-government—it is a sense among the 
governed that they are fundamentally competent to challenge the 
decisions of their representatives and that they experience actual 
power in the political process. Without this experience of power, 
citizens will engage in self-government in the most limited of ways—
voting—and their ability to govern themselves will be restricted by 
the choices presented by those in power. The exercise of power 
cannot be taught by a textbook—it is a habit. Of course the most 
extreme Jeffersonian view is that self-government requires a country 
of yeoman farmers who are trained and accustomed to power.78 John 
Stuart Mill and William Greider have also argued that the experience 
people have 364 days a year necessarily impacts how they conduct 
themselves on the one day a year when they vote. If someone is 
constantly told what to do, prohibited from questioning authority, 
punished for raising complaints, and rewarded for docility in all other 
aspects of their lives, how can we expect her when she encounters a 
Congress member on the street, to ask about why the new health care 
law does not provide for dental policy, even if her daily grievance is 
the inability to pay for dental care?79 
Access to the experience of power is directly related to corporate 
structure. When there are bigger businesses, there are fewer people in 
management positions, and more people who have no daily 
relationship to power (or who experience it only as subjects). There 
are fewer people who work with or witness executive decision-
making. Imagine five major tire companies in this country instead of 
one thousand, and five executives instead of one thousand. If evenly 
distributed over the fifty states there would be twenty executives in 
each state willing to challenge political power, instead of five states 
 
 78.  See generally Benjamin F. Wright, The Philosopher of Jeffersonian Democracy, 22 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 870 (describing the works of John Taylor, one of Thomas Jefferson’s 
contemporaries, who wrote extensively on the American farmer as the democratic ideal).  
 79.  See, e.g., WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE (1993). 
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with executives and forty-five with none. Setting aside their expertise 
in tires, those twenty executives could be political presences in every 
major city in the country, both exhibiting and modeling the vibrant 
sense of self that is required for true self-government. 
If one out of every twenty people in a society is in a decision-
making role, that mode of thought—of responsibility taking—has a 
chance of being part of the civic culture. The culture of responsibility 
taking deeply infuses itself into our lives and changes our internal 
grammar from “x is happening to me” to “I am part of changing x.” 
The internal grammar of the private decision-maker bleeds into the 
internal grammar of the citizen—when she is fluent with power in one 
sphere, it bleeds to the other. 
II.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC LENS OF TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST 
The idea that companies can act as a form of private government 
is not new. The primary expression of this concept is in competition 
policy. “Monopoly” was originally used to describe an exclusive grant 
of power from the government to work a particular trade or sell a 
specific good.80 In Britain, monarchs would sometimes abuse this 
power. Dissatisfied with the funds Parliament allocated her, Queen 
Elizabeth routinely issued royal monopolies as a revenue-generating 
scheme.81 Citizens protested that these exclusive trade privileges 
imposed an undue burden on them in addition to the burden they 
already bore paying taxes to Parliament.82 The higher prices they paid 
to the royal monopoly served, in essence, as a private tax that accrued 
to the Queen.83 
Thomas Jefferson was openly anti-monopoly, as seen in his fear of 
how patents distort power in the political marketplace.84 He supported 
an anti-monopoly provision in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, 
putting it on par with the First Amendment.85 Though the Whigs and 
the Democratic-Republicans disagreed on the importance of 
monopolies, even the most whiggish centralizer assumed that for most 
 
 80.  Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A 
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2012). 
 81.  Id. at 989. 
 82.  Id. at 989–90. 
 83.  Id. at 990. 
 84.  Silvio Bedini, Godfather of American Invention, in SMITHSONIAN BOOK OF 
INVENTION 82– 83 (Alexis Doster, III et al. ed., 1978).  
 85. HOWARD WALTER CALDWELL & CLARK EDMUND PERSINGER, A SOURCE HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 279 (1909). 
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industries, a widely distributed array of producers was necessary.86 A 
popular economic textbook from the 1860s stated: “A general 
Distribution of Capital is . . . of prime importance. By this is meant 
such a condition of things that the capital of a country shall be in 
many hands rather than few. . . . [G]reat aggregation of capital in the 
possession of individuals is disadvantageous because it leads 
inevitably to despotic assumption.”87 Articles in the Harvard Law 
Review and the North American Review condemned the growth of 
concentrated economic power as “feudalism” and a “great, 
unscrupulous, powerful plutocracy.”88 One contemporary decried the 
“political menace that resided in these stupendous aggregations of 
wealth.”89 The belief that decentralized economic power was essential 
for (and inextricable from) political liberty was a mainstay view of the 
day. 
The first federal antitrust law, The Sherman Act, was understood 
at the time in terms that we now associate with campaign finance 
laws.90 When the Sherman Act passed Congress in 1890, Senator John 
Sherman called it, “A bill of rights, a charter of liberty,” and crowed 
about its importance in both economic and political terms.91 Senator 
Sherman viewed the monopolist as another form of monarch. On the 
floor of the Senate in 1890, he declared: 
If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not 
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any 
of the necessities of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we 
should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent 
competition and to fix the price of any commodity.92 
Law Professor James May’s exploration of the Sherman Act’s 
intellectual antecedents shows that for Senator Sherman and the Act’s 
congressional supporters, economic and political freedoms were seen 
as part of a piece. May summarizes the debates around the enactment 
of the Sherman Act as indicating a “widespread congressional 
 
 86.  Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 80, at 993. 
 87.  FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 92 (1886). 
 88.  James Hudson, Modern Feudalism, 144 N. AM. REV. 277, 290 (1887); D.M 
Mickey, Trusts, 22 AM. L. REV. 538, 549 (1888). We are indebted to David Millon for these 
quotations. See generally David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1219, 1227–28 (1988). 
 89.  E. Benjamin Andrews, Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117, 
150 (1889). 
 90.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–7 (West 2014). 
 91.  21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890). 
 92.  21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2457 (1890). 
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commitment to the long-established ideals of economic opportunity, 
security of property, freedom of exchange, and political liberty, and 
considerable hope that antitrust law might prove to be an effective 
vehicle for their substantial, simultaneous realization.”93 Put another 
way, as earlier historians claimed, the “primary motivation of 
Congress in enacting the Sherman Act and every significant 
amendment was concern about the abusive behavior of economic 
giants, real or imagined, and sympathy for their victims, consumers 
and businessmen deprived of alternatives and opportunities.”94 The 
Act grew out of a long “tradition that aimed to control political power 
through decentralization of economic power.”95 
This ideology persisted in related legislation of the early twentieth 
century. In 1914, during the passage of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, Senator Cummins explained, “we must do something to preserve 
the independence of the man as distinguished from the power of the 
corporation; that we must do something to perpetuate the individual 
initiative.”96 Senator Cummins argued for a strong antitrust policy 
despite some economists’ claims that big companies were better for 
the consumer. Conceding the point that aggregation of capital might 
lead to cheaper goods, he argued that “we can purchase cheapness at 
altogether too high a price, if it involves the surrender of the 
individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single 
master mind.”97 The “single master mind” to which he referred was a 
form of tyranny that could destroy self-government, even if it came in 
the technical form of a private company. 
Passed in 1914, the Clayton Act prohibited a corporation from 
acquiring another corporation when the acquisition would result in a 
substantial lessening of competition, or would create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce.98 The debates around the Clayton Act—
explored thoroughly by May—show the same political cast. The 
House Committee Report on the Act argued that “the concentration 
of wealth, money, and property in the United States under the control 
and in the hands of a few individuals or great corporations has grown 
 
 93.  James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in 
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 288 (1989). 
 94.  Harlan Blake & William Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 
384 (1965). 
 95.  Millon, supra note 88, at 1220.  
 96.  51 CONG. REC. 12,742 (1914). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id.  
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to such an enormous extent” and it had to be stopped lest it “threaten 
the perpetuity of our institutions.”99 One congressman explained: 
Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only 
industrial domination but political supremacy as well. . . . Great 
combinations of capital for many years have flaunted their power 
in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their corrupt way 
into politics and government, they have dictated the making of 
laws or scorned the laws they did not like, they have prevented the 
free and just administration of law.100 
Senator Taft’s 1914 book echoed these themes, arguing that 
antitrust was essential in fighting the “plutocracy” of the “great and 
powerful corporations which had, many of them, intervened in politics 
and through use of corrupt machines and bosses threatened us.”101 
Ironically, the greatest burst of antitrust enforcement—as 
distinguished from the antitrust laws themselves—was accompanied 
by an effort to tone down the political content. Thurman Arnold, who 
brought antitrust and competition policy to the center of the 
Roosevelt Administration’s economic policy, downplayed the political 
problems of scale and concentration, and focused on the economic 
harms.102 Arnold is widely recognized for bolstering antitrust by 
adequately staffing and funding its enforcement.103 It is unclear what 
we should make of Arnold’s agnosticism about the political impacts of 
antitrust. On the one hand, one could see Arnold as redefining 
antitrust for the country by justifying his enforcement on economic 
grounds. On the other hand, one could see him as finally enforcing a 
policy that the public had long clamored for—the fact his own 
emphasis was on economy instead of politics and power is of little 
import. Regardless of Arnold’s framing, the law maintained a political 
cast after World War II. 
 
 
 99.  H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, at 19 (1914). 
 100.  51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914). 
 101.  WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 
(1914).  
 102.  See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMOND ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 
(2005). 
 103.  Under Arnold’s tenure, “the number of Antitrust Division employees grew from 
eighteen to nearly five hundred, and the budget more than quadrupled.”  Spencer Weber 
Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 570, 582 (2004). The 
Division reached its peak in 1942 “with a staff of 583 persons and a budget of $2,325,000. 
Between 1938 and 1940, the number of new cases jumped from eleven to ninety-two, while the 
number of investigations jumped from fifty-nine to two hundred fifteen.” Id. 
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Courts, while looking at market share, did not limit themselves to 
economic analysis, but saw the role of antitrust in terms of limiting 
concentrated power in both the economic and political spheres.104 
Cartels and dominant business interests were associated with the 
political economies of Japan and Germany—anti-big-business 
sentiments may have come from experience with business cartels 
associated with harsh World War I governments in these countries. In 
1941, the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson105 openly read 
the antitrust statutes in light of, and to be harmonized with, earlier 
labor acts that had declared a commitment to decentralized economic 
power as part of the public policy of the United States. 
In the major antitrust treatise of the late 1950s, Karl Kaysen and 
Donald Turner wrote about the goals of antitrust.106 Kaysen and 
Turner were both Harvard Law Professors, and Turner later became 
the chief antitrust lawyer in President Johnson’s Justice Department. 
They argued that the goal of antitrust was a “proper distribution of 
power” in the economic sphere.107 This goal, they said, derived from 
the work of Thomas Jefferson and principles of autonomy that were 
central to American political ideology.108 Moreover, they argued that 
“business units are politically irresponsible, and therefore large 
powerful business units are dangerous.”109 They saw the goal of the 
Sherman Act as being to “protect equal opportunity and equal access 
for small business for noneconomic reasons: concentration of 
resources in the hands of a few was viewed as a social and political 
catastrophe.”110 
Turner and Kaysen’s view was reflected in contemporary court 
cases, although the courts were more constrained by the brief text of 
the Act. In 1945, Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum 
Company of America (Alcoa),111 first discussed the economic 
arguments against monopoly but endorsed the “belief that great 
industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of 
their economic results.”112 He referred to Senator Sherman’s stated 
 
 104.  See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 105.  312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
 106.  See generally CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959). 
 107.  Id. at 17. 
 108.  Id. at 17–18.  
 109.  Id. at 17.  
 110.  Id. at 19.  
 111.  148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 112.  Id. at 428–29. 
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concerns about limiting aggregated capital because of the 
“helplessness of the individual before them.”113 Moreover, he noted 
that later statutes including the Surplus Property Act and the Small 
Business Mobilization Act had been rightly interpreted in Hutcheson 
to shape the meaning of the antitrust Acts. “Throughout the history of 
these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their 
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite 
of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can 
effectively compete with each other.”114 Antitrust as a force for 
decentralization was important “for its own sake and in spite of 
possible cost.”115 
In 1948 in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,116 Justice Douglas 
explained: 
We have here the problem of bigness. . . . The philosophy of the 
Sherman Act is that . . . all power tends to develop into a 
government in itself. Power that controls the economy . . . should 
be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people 
will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political 
prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The 
fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and social 
minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and command of the 
Sherman Act.117 
In 1950, Congress amended the antitrust laws by passing the 
Celler-Kefauver Act, in response to a burst of merger activity.118 Like 
in the Sherman Act, precise definitions were lacking, but the Celler-
Kefauver Act pressed both political and economic aims. In this era, 
the Antitrust Division tended to be very successful in blocking 
mergers119—and the political vision persisted. In 1959, Carl Kaysen 
 
 113.  Id. at 428. 
 114.  Id. at 429. When the Norris-LaGuardia act of 1932 was passed, not an antitrust act 
itself but a labor rights act, it explained that it was the “public policy of the United States” to 
protect individual unorganized workers in the face of corporate power. Norris-LaGuardia 
described corporate power in terms of “prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid 
of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms 
of ownership association.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2014). 
 115.  Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 429. 
 116.  334 U.S. 495 (1948). 
 117.  Id. at 535.  
 118.  Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). 
 119.  See JONATHAN BAKER & CARL SCHAPIRO, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT 
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235–67 
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).  
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and Donald Turner proposed “no fault” concentration legislation.120 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States121 in 1962, the Supreme Court 
said that Congress’s vision in the Sherman Act was to “promote 
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned 
business.”122 Congress understood that this vision might lead to higher 
costs and prices, due to costs associated with “fragmented industries 
and markets.”123 However, Congress “resolved these competing 
considerations in favor of decentralization.”124 
Likewise, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,125 the 
Supreme Court upheld the block of a bank merger between the 
second and third largest regional banks, which would have led to one 
bank controlling 30 percent of commercial banking.126 Despite the 
lack of evidence that this 30 percent interest would have negative 
effects on competition, the Court held that it need not have 
“elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable 
anticompetitive effects.”127 Instead, the high market share alone 
showed “inherently anticompetitive tendency.”128 The Clayton Act 
barred “anticompetitive mergers, benign and malignant alike,” and in 
interpreting the statute, the Court recognized that there were 
concerns about concentration that were not directly measurable.129 
From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, there was a sea change in 
the understanding of antitrust, and a hard-fought intellectual battle 
over its purposes. Chicago school theorists Richard Posner and 
Robert Bork—building on the work of Aaron Director—argued that 
current doctrine was based on flawed economic ideological premises 
and that efficiency and consumer welfare—not the goal of aiding 
small businesses or having a decentralized economy—were the only 
legitimate goals of the antitrust statutes.130 Posner argued that there 
was no justification for “using the antitrust laws to attain goals 
unrelated or antithetical to efficiency, such as promoting a society of 
 
 120.  See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 106, at 265–72. 
 121.  370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 122.  Id. at 344. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 126.  Id. at 371. 
 127.  Id. at 363. 
 128.  Id. at 366. 
 129.  Id. at 371. 
 130.  See Robert H. Bork & Ward Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
363, 375 (1965). 
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small tradespeople.”131 Bork similarly argued that any political or 
social concerns were necessarily indeterminate, created 
unmanageable standards, and were normatively unjustifiable.132 
In every important way, these theorists won the war. However, the 
political vision of antitrust remained an essential part of the antitrust 
lawyer’s understanding at least through the early 1980s. Though the 
courts turned away from checking anything but bad behavior, 
politicians with a different economic vision, concerned about 
concentration qua concentration, continued to fight for decentralizing 
economic laws.133 In 1968, a White House Antitrust Task Force 
recommended limiting mergers for companies with more than $500 
million in sales or $250 million in assets.134 In 1972, Senator Hart 
proposed a “no fault” de-concentration law that would have set an 
absolute cap on how concentrated industries could become.135 In 1979, 
Ted Kennedy introduced a bill that would have limited mergers of 
companies with over $2 billion assets (close to $6 billion in today’s 
dollars).136 There was a fierce intellectual debate over the 1968 report 
and the 1979 bill, coming as they did when the law and economics 
models were gaining strength, and when the traditional, political 
antitrust people still had significant political power.137 
Donald Turner, among others, argued that antitrust had always 
been a unique area of law—somewhere between constitutional and 
traditional statutory law—and that it would always reflect the 
economic views of the country.138 But Turner became increasingly 
isolated in the 1970s, as the dominant figures in the field adopted 
variations of the Posner/Bork model, rejecting both limitations on 
corporate size and arguments for decentralized corporate 
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 133.  Phil Neal et al., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, 2 
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HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1222 (1969) (citing Justice Hughes for his description of the ways in which 
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competition. 
Unfortunately, when the Posner/Bork model came to dominate 
antitrust, it did not just infect the particular field of antitrust law, but 
also the larger understanding of the relationship between corporate 
and political law. We have lost, therefore, the intellectual habit of 
seeing through the integrated lens that the earlier political antitrust 
framework provided. We see political problems in isolation from 
economic ones, diminishing our capacity to analyze either arena 
accurately. 
The ideological radicalism of these public choice theorists did not 
lie in their commitment to “efficiency” and modeling, but in their core 
belief that politics and economics are severable. Though their sub-
theories were debated and discussed at the time, and the empirical 
evidence for their claims successfully challenged, the great success of 
the “law and economics” movement was in shaping the taxonomies of 
study. Economics and business are one area of study; constitutional 
law and election law are another. 
This separation of economic and political thinking goes very deep 
and has shaped popular media, political rhetoric, and activist groups. 
Since the 1970s, reformers from left and right have turned their 
energies toward laws regulating the shape of the governing 
institutions (like Congress), instead of laws regulating the creation 
and shape of the influencing institutions (like Bank of America).139 
Though right and left democracy reformers have different sets of 
beliefs about corporate law and liabilities, it is rare that either focuses 
on antitrust or corporate size and structure. This is not merely 
intellectually troubling, it is historically strange; prior to the 1970s, 
reformers would talk about money and politics in terms of market 
structure as something government could do something about. 
It is no accident that the law and economics movement started in 
antitrust, which seemed a bit of a backwater, and spread from 
antitrust out into other parts of business law. If the law and economics 
scholars could convince others that antitrust—the most political of 
economic laws—had nothing to do with political culture or elections, 
or with representative democracy and power, then it would be far 
 
 139.  The decline shows itself in absences—the absence of antitrust law in election law 
journals, the absence of political discussions in antitrust law casebooks. There have always been 
dissenters and critics, but the overall tendency of both disciplines—election law and antitrust—
has been towards ignoring company size and concentration as a political threat.  
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easier to convince them that other factors of corporate law and 
structure were also fundamentally non-political. 
When politics was taken out of economics, the study of economic 
structures was gradually extracted from politics. Until Citizens United 
forced corporate law scholars to consider the political responsibilities 
of the SEC,140 most corporate law and most antitrust law doctrines 
assumed an internal world of markets—flawed or successful—
separate from a political world. Frameworks for thinking about 
capture, rent, and campaign finance have limited our sense of 
possibility—the same players, with different sets of tools (or the same 
set, repackaged), return to the same sandboxes over and over again 
without looking out over the playground. But this is not the only 
sandbox. The tendency to “study markets in splendid isolation from 
such political acts”141 can limit the imagination of the person involved 
in thinking through democratic design, and can lead to false 
conceptions of how the market and government actually work. 
Instead of seeing political organizations—like Congress or political 
parties—as the only place in which we might make political rules, we 
ought to also see corporations as a place to make political rules. In 
order to open up corporate structure rules to political conversations, 
we must first recognize that corporations are political organizations. 
III.  TO TACKLE THE SECOND GILDED AGE, HEED LESSONS FROM 
THE FIRST 
A. Market Structure is Political Structure 
Arguably, all corporate forms are political because they owe their 
existence to law. When a corporation wields sufficient economic 
power, we should view it as a political institution outright, which 
means market structure implicates our democratic polity and process. 
This view was innate to traditional competition policy and, as our 
taxonomy above shows, is still pertinent today. 
The political role and relevance of corporations was legitimated 
and elevated by the Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion that 
corporations are political entities. In Citizens United, the Court held 
that a law limiting uncoordinated speech that was designed to elect or 
defeat candidates violated the First Amendment, resting its opinion 
 
 140.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 141.  PERITZ, supra note 6, at 241.  
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on a few concerns.142 For the purposes of this Article, what is most 
important is that the Court adopted a view that corporations should 
be political organizations in order to question, and check, the power 
of government—activities we traditionally conceive as responsibilities 
of citizenship. The Court called corporate independent spending 
“indispensable to decision-making in a democracy.”143 After Citizens 
United, the official political theory of the United States is that 
corporations are much like—if not exactly like—political parties, 
labor unions, and other entities that constitute an essential part of the 
political architecture of the country. Its decision turned corporate 
involvement in elections from a loophole-seeking practice to a 
practice endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
Many of the factors that will lead to corporate exercises of 
political power are a function of, or correlated with, company size or 
market concentration. The capacity to fund elections, achieve 
regulatory and information capture, influence employers, create 
structural dependencies, regulate markets, and tax are—to a good 
degree—furnished by economic dominance. 
B. Antitrust and Other Structural Interventions as Political Law and 
Tools 
Once we see the eight forms of power as integrated and market 
structure as political, structural interventions that would seem 
illegitimate as mere market interventions instead appear legitimate. 
Elections are political institutions and the particular design choices 
about them have deep political impacts. For example, the date of 
elections, the form of the ballot, the form of voter registration, and 
questions about who can appear on the ballot are deeply important 
questions of democratic design. Congressional districts are political 
institutions and over the last 200 years their size, shape, and type 
(single member/multimember) have been changing. In designing their 
size, qualifications, and rules regarding government are fundamental 
questions of democratic design. 
In shaping political institutions, questions of size and scale are 
recurrent themes. Since the days of Plato, who thought the ideal size 
of a political community was 5040 people, these highly technical 
questions of size have been front and center in institutional design.144 
 
 142.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–41, 372. 
 143.  Id. at 349 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).  
 144.  ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk 7, pt. IV (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1885) (c. 350 BCE), 
TEACHOUT 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:35 PM 
2014] MARKET STRUCTURE & POLITICAL LAW 71 
Should a state legislature have a representative for every 5000 people, 
or every 50,000? How should campaigns be funded and how much 
should individuals be allowed to contribute? How frequently should 
elections be held? How should district size be determined? All of 
these are basic questions of democratic design surrounding political 
institutions. Similar kinds of questions should be addressed to 
corporate size. 
Up to now, in the public debate about money, power, and 
influence in politics, most structural reforms have focused on 
Congress and on the laws governing elections. Publicly funded 
elections, filibuster reform, and transparency tend to be Congress-
centric. Alternatively, laws designed to increase ballot box access, 
reform gerrymandering, or include mail-in ballots are election-
process-centric. Election law scholars debate how campaigns should 
work to minimize corruption, what role parties should have, and the 
role of the media. But in all these areas the attention is focused on 
one or two discrete kinds of levers. 
Reformers have focused far less on corporate law itself, yet this 
Article argues that addressing market structure—or minimally 
viewing it as a site for political action—might help the left and right 
both achieve their stated goals. An explicit recognition that many 
corporations are political organizations opens up a new category of 
structural changes that might improve representative government and 
engagement. It enables one to think about incentives and 
disincentives for investment in lobbying, for example, not by focusing 
on lobbying, but by looking at how corporate size, scope, and industry 
concentration interact with lobbying to either encourage more or less 
of it. It also enables one to think about how excesses of corporate size, 
scope, and industry concentration undercut democratic self-
governance in ways that lobbying and campaign finance reform do 
not address. 
The corporate form is a tool that encourages a particular set of 
structures. It provides subsidies for certain business activities in 
exchange for public goods that would not be created by the 
government. Corporate charters can be as expansive or restrictive as 
we desire them to be as can corporate liability. Instead of focusing 
solely on Congress, the recognition of the corporation as a political 
organization allows for a more imaginative approach to the puzzles of 
 
available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.7.seven.html. 
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representation, as well as one more attuned to the realities of how 
power is exercised. 
In teaching the law of politics, it is difficult to paint a fair picture 
of the ecosystem of influences that interplay around an election 
without a deeper understanding of the political organizations of 
corporations, yet the classic portrait painted in election law textbooks 
focuses on the internal structure and decision-making of one set of 
important political actors—those within political parties—and only 
pays a passing glance to the structure of other sets of important 
political actors, like media companies and other corporations. This 
leads to extensive examination of the rules governing one set of 
political actors and almost no examination of the rules governing 
another. 
It is clear, however, that the market structure in which 
corporations act crucially shapes the polity, as well as the ability of 
citizens to govern themselves. If the only problem we guard against is 
lobbying and campaign donations, we will have a democracy 
protected from one exercise of private economic power—bribery—
but not from other ways in which corporations wield power either to 
influence government or to govern us. In light of this, our goal in this 
Article is modest: to encourage political reformers to view market 
structure as a site for governance. Like other political tools and 
institutions, such as elections and Congress, market structure can be 
designed in a way that promotes democracy or that undercuts it. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The hope in this Article is twofold: First, that we encourage a way 
of seeing corporate power; and second, that this way of seeing births a 
language, or at least starts the process of looking for language—both 
to describe this power and to identify the political tools and 
mechanisms for harnessing it, scaling it back, or whatever we, as 
citizens, decide. 
Decentralization of economic power in most areas of commerce is 
an essential underpinning of political freedom. A society with strong 
voting rights, speech protections, and fair elections cannot realize 
democratic principles with an oligarchic economy. For law this means 
that antitrust and other de-concentration rules should be understood 
not solely as part of corporate law, but also as part of political law. In 
this light, a revival of antitrust policy could be one of the most 
effective forms of improving democratic self-government in ways that 
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are typically associated with campaign finance reform. 
Some of this Article has been theoretical, but the issues it 
addresses are very current. Six banks largely control the financial 
industry. Steady consolidation across agriculture, retail, healthcare, 
and manufacturing has left a few dominant companies that each 
wields enormous power over their respective industries and our polity. 
Their size enables a form of private governance that encroaches on 
our rights as citizens. Existing antitrust is far too feeble for the task of 
unwinding this power. The public choice theorists who effectively 
killed it did not realize that true antitrust was actually their own 
intellectual father—the tool that could lead to market 
competitiveness and reduce the amount of concentrated money spent 
influencing government at the same time. 
You can see the American impulse to antitrust appearing in 
Jonathan Macey and James P. Holdcroft Jr.’s recent article about 
limiting bank size,145 in the business journalist Barry C. Lynn’s book 
Cornered,146 in Robert Reich’s support for breaking up banks,147 and 
even in Alan Greenspan’s suggestion that companies too big to fail 
are too big to exist.148 This impulse is gradually creeping out and 
finding its way into legislation. During the financial reform fight, 
Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio and Senator Ted Kaufman of 
Delaware proposed a simple new law that the New York Times 
endorsed: They wanted to put a cap on bank size.149 Brown/Kaufman 
would have made it illegal for any financial institution to have non-
deposit liabilities (debts and obligations) larger than 2–3 percent of 
GDP.150 
This is a good start but far too meager. The largest limited liability 
companies are too complex to manage, too difficult to regulate, and 
 
 145.  Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1370 (2011) (“In our view, the only 
precommitment device that enables the government to make a credible promise to refrain from 
future massive bailouts is to act preemptively to prevent financial institutions from growing so 
large that they become too big to fail.”).  
 146.  See generally LYNN, supra note 68. 
 147.  Robert Reich, Break Up the Big Banks, Says the Dallas Fed, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 
29, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/dallas-fed-wall-street_b_1388443.html. 
 148.  Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up 
Large Banks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg.  
 149.  The Hard Work on Financial Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, 
http://prospect.org/article/new-financial-reform-bill-would-break-banks.  
 150.  Id.  
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are often effectively immune from criminal prosecutions. Their size 
allows them to operate outside of normal democratic constraints and 
their use of their economic power undermines our democracy. In 
many ways, the excesses of corporate power constitute a defining 
challenge of our present moment, yet we have lost the conceptual 
tools to fully identify and understand it. Our intent is to recover both 
the vision and language to interrogate this power, so that we as 
citizens can then decide how to structure and harness it. 
 
